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The implosion of clientelistic Italy in the 
1990s: a study of “peaceful change” 
in comparative political economy
Stefa n o  G uzzini
This chapter analyses the societal dynamics underlying peaceful change. 
Its main theme is the concomitant peaceful changes in Europe and with­
in Italy. It is a response to international analysts who have tried to 
explain the changes in Italy mainly in terms of the end of the Cold 
War. This essay proposes several arguments against a top-down analys­
is, which attaches a prior analytical place to changes in the international 
balance of power in fixing the range of domestic changes. It argues first 
that the end of the Cold War cannot be convincingly shown to have af­
fected the internal dynamics so as to trigger the recent “revolution” in 
Italy? Second, Italy’s “internal” dynamics can only be understood as a 
single instance of comparable transnational changes in some parts of the 
global political economy. Contrary to the view which sees the end of 
the Cold War as triggering domestic changes, both changes are inci­
dences of adjustment processes to globalisation pressures exerted by 
markets, information and peoples. It will be argued that the recent 
changes should be seen as the effect of transnational and societal 
dynamics on modern welfare states that have upset the 
consociational/clientelistic bargain on which Italy’s domestic political- 
economy rested. The success of the judiciary campaign mani pulite 
(“clean hands”) has been triggered by the concomitant financial crisis 
of the state, its parties and major Italian industries which undermined 
the major actors’ ability to uphold their clientelistic systems.
After a short exposition of the methodological and conceptual 
assumptions in opposition to the “end-of-the-Cold-War” perspective, the 
Italian case will be presented as the implosion of four intermingled 
clientelistic networks. The conclusion integrates the Italian case into a 































































































1. Choosing a methodological and conceptual framework
After World War II, the OECD-world (excluding Turkey and including 
Finland), succeeded in limiting the rising participatory political and 
distributive economic demands of (national) mass mobilised societies 
within a global political economy. This compromise is in a deep crisis. 
The globalising dynamics of technology, knowledge and communica­
tion, transmitted by persons, media and/or markets, affect state authority 
transnationally. The diffusion of authority implies that state-society 
relations cannot be thought of in inside/outside terms: some power 
structures organise themselves and build up borders that do not follow 
the national ones. International politics “destatalises”.1
Taking the diffusion of authority seriously means that politics must 
) be understood globally. In the present European context, domestic 
events are always an international event.Networks of markets, persons, 
and ideas organise themselves more and more transnationally and can 
thus affect actions across, and sometimes even independent of, state- 
borders. The domestic struggle in Russia is of immediate international 
significance, and part of European (and indeed world) politics. The 
significance depends on the potential to affect actions - wherever. For 
capturing this view, the concept of Europa-Innenpolitik (European 
domestic politics) will be introduced.
In other words, it is not only because there are transborder links that 
the Italian case is a matter for IR/IPE, but also because events internal 
to Italian dynamics are part and parcel of the plurinational context in 
which politics articulates itself in the greater part of Europe today.
Peaceful change
This chapter approaches peaceful change from a conception of politics 
as necessarily “transversal”. This implies a redefinition both of large- 
scale violence, and of normatively relevant global processes.
First, the minimum definition of peace is the avoidance of large- 
scale violence. The inter-state approach will conceive of peaceful 
change as the establishment of an order that limits (inter-state) war. A 
global political approach must broaden the definition of large-scale viol- 1
1 Therefore, the “diffusion of authority” should not be confused with a simple 



























































































The implosion o f clientelistic Italy in the 1990s 3
ence to include phenomena such as environmental destruction (violence 
also against the present and future generations) and famine. As one 
cannot fully apprehend these phenomena in terms of intentional agency, 
the analysis of peaceful change must integrate unintended effects for the 
understanding of the context of action (see also Patomaki in this 
volume). Not all actions, individual or collective, can have important — 
although possibly unintended — effects.2 In judging the context for 
action, agents must take into account what effects could occur, whether 
intentional or not. To judge whether or not they are conducive to peace 
depends on the way in which peace and peaceful change are conceived. 
Friedenspolitik as process and peace research cannot ignore actions and 
dynamics, whether intended, unforseen, unintended or even impersonal.
Second, this wider vision of the dynamics that can enable or obstruct 
peaceful change requires a redefinition of politics. Taking the diffusion 
of authority seriously, implies a conception of politics as all action that 
significantly affects the public sphere, be the agent a (public) govern­
ment or a (private) firm or an interest group. Consequently, Dieter 
Senghaas has, for instance, integrated public and private networks in a 
European approximation of Karl Deutsch’s pluralist security community 
based on democratic principles, all-European institutions for conflict 
management and collective security, domestic and intra-European wel­
fare distribution, and even inter-cultural empathy. The success of such 
a policy depends on its capacity to be politically satisfying, i.e. to 
provide enhanced returns in terms of democracy (in particular human 
rights), security (peaceful conflict management), welfare and the 
management of a peaceful coexistence of multiple cultural identities.3 
The “front” for a peace-furthering policy, so to speak, becomes enlarged 
to include a societal level. He calls this encompassing policy
2 Both this particular capacity to effect and the diffusion of the origins of power 
are aspects of what has been called “structural power”. See Susan Strange, States and 
Markets. An Introduction to International Political Economy (New York: Basil Black- 
well, 1988), pp. 23-32. For a critique of the debate, regarding whether or not uninten­
ded or impersonal effecting should be included in a single concept of power, see 
Stefano Guzzini, “Structural Power. The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis,” Inter­
national Organization, vol. 47, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 443-78.





























































































Weltinnenpolitik (world domestic policy).4
In that respect, the relevance of the Italian case within a viable 
Friedenspolitik should be seen as part of a political realm which could 
be described as “European” or “OECD domestic policy”. This concept 
needs some elaboration. It differs slightly from Senghaas’ framework. 
He derived the concept from the trans- and supranational networks that 
undermine state sovereignty. Yet, it is not clear if he confers a political 
status to these networks. Although he might well have conceived it 
differently, Friedenspolitik is seen as a question of mere state policies, 
as in his example of humanitarian interventions. The above-mentioned 
conception of politics is however wider and carries some of the 
connotations of the concept of “totale AuBenpolitik” (total foreign 
policy) elaborated by Ekkehart Krippendorff.5 He defended a view of 
foreign policy as emanating from the society or state-society nexus. 
“Foreign” policy cannot be abstracted from “domestic” society. In the 
modern age of mass-democracies, a societal conception of foreign 
policy must include all aspects of society. Its very efficiency depends 
on the capacity to respond to external threats on all domestic levels. 
Foreign policy becomes “total”. With regard to the following case, the 
mainly internal dynamics of changes in Italy should therefore be judged 
for being part of this wider realm of politics.
The final question is what Friedenspolitik should pursue in the post­
wall system? This chapter will touch the state-societal angle of OECD 
domestic politics, focusing primarily on the struggle for the necessary 
reform of Western democracies. Starting from the diffusion of authority 
in the global system, we face a crisis of liberalism in its different 
understandings: it is a crisis (1) of a rights-based democratic theory 
because its necessary international organisation seems to undermine the 
consensus in the existing democracies; (2) of representation because 
major authorities cannot be controlled and because the domestic elite 
have rendered themselves transnational and less domestically respons­
ive; and (3) of the welfare state consensus due to the fiscal crisis, its
4 Dieter Senghaas, “Weltinnenpolitik — Ansàtze fiir ein Konzept,” Europa-Archiv, 
vol. 47, no. 22 (25 November 1992), pp. 643-52.
5 Ekkehart Krippendorff (1963) “1st AuBenpolitik AujSenpolitik? Ein Beitrag zur 
Theorie und der Versuch, eine unhaltbare Unterscheidung aufzuheben,” in Ekkehart 




























































































The implosion o f clientelistic Italy in the 1990s 5
possibly excessive intrusion into the private sphere, and inversely the 
prominent influence of the economic sphere on the political system.
This approach presupposes that a democratic system that manages 
to reform itself will breed a better management of domestic conflicts 
and project possible solutions to a disoriented Central and Eastern 
Europe.6 Both can be seen as conditions for a more peaceful system. 
Furthermore, many of the democratic problems cannot be resolved in 
any other way, than trans- and plurinationally. This will be the litmus 
test for approaching a pluralist security community.
A study in comparative political economy
The diffusion of authority in the present global political economy im­
plies also a methodological shift. The present study takes up some of 
the ideas that international theory had been advancing but which have 
not become predominant. It proposes a way to join a recently invigor­
ated attempt to build “societal” theories of international relations.
Since the late 1960s, not only Western democracies, but also the dis­
cipline of International Relations (IR) has shown signs of a major crisis. 
The emergence of new sectors of international politics brought forward 
a research programme most succinctly summed up as the synthesis of 
“traditional international politics, the bureaucratic politics approach and 
transnational actors.”7 Yet, the potential integration of the state-society 
link into IR remained limited to the political or decision-making system. 
During the 1970s, the initial impulse to explore the mismatch between 
the new transnational political economy and domestic dynamics has 
been increasingly forgotten.8
Expectedly, the threads were taken up in other places, in a new
6 Dieter Senghaas and Michael Ziirn call this “positive Ausstrahlungseffekte” 
(positive effects of attraction) in a catalogue of questions that peace research should 
address, in “Kernfragen fiir die Friedensforschung der neunziger Jahre,” Politische 
Vierteljahresschrift, vol. 33, no. 3 (1992), p. 460.
1 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr., Transnational Relations and World 
Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 380.
8 After all, the transnational research programme started off from the effects of 
transnationalisation on (national) democratic control, i.e. on the mismatch between 
transnational politics based on national constituencies. See Karl Kaiser, “Transnationa­
le Politik. Zu einer Theorie der multinationalen Politik,” in Ernst-Otto Czempiel (ed.), 




























































































discipline, International Political Economy (IPE). Until now, the result 
has been an even bigger picture of the world which increase the endo­
genous variables of the analysis. Too many variables means, however, 
that research renders many of them exogenous in order to come up with 
some basic causal links. Thus, the opening up of sociology had the 
unfortunate result that whereas IR starts to reconceptualise the impact 
of borders, a more international historical sociology reinforces statism.9 
Similar reductions also apply to structural theories which. They tend to 
objectify the international realm either in IR as anarchical system of 
self-help or in IPE as post-fordist regime of accumulation. Thereby, 
they tend to reify states as mere particular examples of a wider logic.
The present chapter is an attempt to avoid both these reductions. A 
more integrated interdisciplinary research is heralded by the develop­
ment of dependency theory away from a strong outside-in emphasis,10 1
as much as by the internationalisation of democratic theory," and the 
international political economy of welfare states.12 This chapter is 
based on the following methodological strategy:
(1) The “international” is broken down into several networks that 
today often have a transnational or international (via the government) 
dynamic of their own. The problem is then to construct an analysis 
founded on the articulation of these subsystems;13
(2) In order to identify the significant subsystems, the following 
discussion will draw on approaches of comparative politics or socio-
9 For sociological statism, see Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985).
10 For the dependency school that makes the external-internal articulation its focus 
point, see e.g. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, “Associated Dependent Development: 
Theoretical and Practical Implications,” in Alfred Stepan (ed.) Authoritarian Brazil. 
Origins, Policies and Futures (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 142-176; 
Peter Evans, Dependent Development. The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local 
Capital in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).
11 David Held, “Democracy, the nation-state and the global system,” Economy and 
Society, vol. 20, no. 2 (May 1991), pp. 138-72.
12 See for instance John Gerard Ruggie (ed.) The Antinomies o f Interdependence. 
National Welfare and the International Division of Welfare (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983), and Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets. 
Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985).
13 This is, of course, close to the initial transnationalist research programme. For 
a view of the world as interlocking networks, see Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Internationale 



























































































The implosion o f clientelistic Italy in the 1990s 7
logy. The capacity to construct comparable stories for Italy and other 
countries should be interpreted as an indicator of dynamics shared 
plurinationally. Although the empirical analysis is limited here to a 
single state-society nexus, the significance of the case is grasped via 
comparison, and the research aims at developing analytical frameworks 
applicable to multiple cases. It is thus not based on a variable-centred 
comparative approach, but is case-centred14 which must be necessarily 
transnationally analyzed.
The result is certainly a hybrid; a research note on the road to a 
more comprehensive and interdisciplinary approach. Although more 
interpretivist, it shares many of the features of what Ronen Palan has 
labelled “second structuralist theories” such as, for instance, the 
tendency to build explanation from the bottom up and to be sceptical 
about purely global frameworks; to allow for a relative autonomy (for 
analytical purposes) both of international/transnational processes, and 
state-society processes, but require both to be discussed concomitantly; 
the refusal of structural determinism and a greater scope for historical 
contingencies.15
After these methodological and conceptual preliminaries, we can 
turn to the discussion of the explanations of recent changes in Italy.
2. The “long night of the First Republic”
With the beginning of the 1990s and in an astounding acceleration of 
events, we find the familiar post-war Italian political landscape in ruins.
The established party system is wrecked. The Communist Party (PCI) 
split into the “Democratic Party of the Left” (PDS) and “Communist 
Refoundation” (RC). Two new movements have split from the Christian 
Democratic Party (DC) in 1992, namely the left-wing La Rete headed v /  
by the former mayor of Palermo, Leoluca Orlando and Mario Segni’s
14 For this distinction, see Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative Method. Moving 
beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1987).
15 Ronen Palan, “The Second Structuralist Theories of International Relations: A 
Research Note,” International Studies Notes, vol. 17, no. 3 (Fall 1992), pp. 22-29. For 
an attempt to rescue a societal theory of Liberalism, see Andrew Moravcsik, “Liberal­
ism and International Relations Theory” (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University. The 






























































































centrist Patto per I’ltalia. After the last electoral defeat in June and the 
partial municipal elections in December 1993, where it rated as only the 
fourth national party, the DC split once again in January 1994 with the 
main party refounded as Partito Popolare Italiano, and a small fraction 
(CCD) which allied with the Forza Italia. The Liberal Party (PLI) 
dissolved itself into a loose network. The Social Democratic Party 
(PSDI) has gone bankrupt. The Socialists (PSI) split and were reduced 
to (electoral) insignificance in the general elections of March 1994.16
Large sections of the economic and political elite have been 
arrested. Political and economic leaders, at the top until 1992, are under 
investigation, both in (as several former ministers and company 
managers) and out of jail (as in the case of Craxi and Andreotti). In 
addition, the bureaucratic organisation has been restructured (1) at the 
top where through the use of referenda, ministries have been abolished 
(the Ministries of Agriculture and of Tourism);17 and (2) at the bottom, 
where lifetime contracts of public officials have been abolished. Finally, 
violence between organised crime and representatives of the State 
escalated with the killing of the two main anti-Mafia prosecutors and 
the capture of the presumed top mafia boss who had escaped arrest 
while residing in Italy for decades. As the electoral law has been 
revised on the local and national level to abolish the pure proportional 
system, commentators discuss the transition to a “Second Republic” in 
Italy. Why did the unexpected happen; and why so suddenly?
Italian changes as response to a lifted bipolar “overlay”
The concomitance of domestic change in Italy and the end of the Cold 
War provoked hypotheses that draw direct correlations between these 
events. With the end of the superpower “overlay” in Europe, the lid 
constraining foreign policy options and behaviour of states was lift­
ed.18 This originally Neorealist research programme has been extended
16 For a comprehensive account of the organizational transformation of individual 
Italian parties and the entire system, see Luciano Bardi and Leonardo Morlino, “Italian 
Parties. The Great Transformation?” (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, Washington D.C., 2-5 September 1993).
17 In blatant contradiction to the referendum, the Ministry of Agriculture has been 
re-installed under another name.
18 Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer, and Ole 



























































































The implosion o f clientelistic Italy in the 1990s 9
to include the freeing of domestic dynamics. There exist two versions 
of this top-down argument.
The first is a remake of the “Back to the Future” argument which 
attributes recent Italian changes to the same factors which gave rise to 
nationalism in central Europe: the resurrection of suppressed conflicts. 
In its strongest version, domestic conflicts had come to a halt when they 
were overlaid by the superpower competition. Once the overlay was 
withdrawn, domestic history picks up where it left off. This approach 
is static on the domestic and international levels. Both realms repeat 
continuously their inherently conflictual character. This view presuppo­
ses that domestic and international dynamics can be viewed on their 
own, their “interaction” being limited to the cases where one dynamic 
impedes the other to develop. This rather crude version has not been 
used for Italy.19
The second “top-down” reading would interpret overlay not just as 
a suppression, but as an international (reshaping of domestic conflicts. 
In the physicist analogies so honoured by Realists, the metaphor is that 
of magnetic attraction or electrolytic polarisation. This has been applied 
to Italy. Let us follow this explanation step by step.
The reason for this strong parallel between the international and 
domestic change lies in the reproduction of the East-West conflict in 
domestic politics. After World War II, while Germany was territorially 
divided, Italy became a politically divided country. The legitimation of 
both poles was inextricably linked with external dynamics. The PCI’s 
closeness to the Eastern bloc was perceived as a threat to Western 
defence, and consequently its access to power had to be prevented.20
(London: Pinter Publications, 1990), in particular pp. 41-44.
19 A non-Neorealist approach to the “Back to the Future” argument would analyse 
how in the ideological void after the demise of communism, the (often idealised) pre­
communist era reappears as a reference point. “Back to the Future” here is not a histo­
rical dynamic starting anew, but a construction by present actors and discourses. I am 
indebted to Anna Leander for this point.
/ “ /For a punctual and self-legitimating reminder of Western pressure at the G7 
meeting in Puerto Rico in 1976, where Helmut Schmidt declared on behalf of the 
group that a government with the PCI would constitute a break with NATO, see the 
interview with Giulio Andreotti, “Dunkle Schatten liber Italien,” Der Spiegel, vol. 47, 
no. 31 (2-8 August 1993), p. 112. Western policy was not only verbal. The CIA spon­
sored groups called “Stay Behind”. These groups, using means of the secret services, 




























































































Interestingly, some commentators consider the international options of 
the PCI as a democratic litmus test. In 1977, the PCI officially declared 
its distance from the Soviet Union (“lo strappo”, the rift) and supported 
Italy’s membership of both the EEC and NATO. At the same time, the 
DC did its best both to invoke anticommunism, and to avoid the emerg­
ence of any party outside the PCI that might threaten the communist’s 
monopoly of opposition.21 Through this strategy it effectively managed 
to maintain a permanent deadlock in the political system. The PCI was 
never allowed to assume the role of alternant and became increasingly 
coopted into the policy-making of DC-run governments.
This system locked at the top undermined its legitimacy at the 
bottom. People went on voting, knowing in advance that nothing would 
change. When the East-West conflict eased, the legitimation of the two 
major political parties was shattered. The defeat of communism and the 
change of the international system meant that containment at the Italian 
front was not needed any longer, and broke up the remaining electoral 
discipline. Italian voters “now know that they can choose among all 
existing forces without endangering democracy in Italy.”22 Since then, 
the leading parties have been in free fall.
In the wake of the 1992 elections little is clear other than that the first 
Italian republic is all but dead. Contrary to the views of eminent academ­
ics, anticommunism was the only reason why the Italian people tolerated 
it. As soon as they were able to junk the system safely, they set about the 
task with gusto.21
This change has been eased, so this analysis runs, by the emergence of 
a new anti-system party, the Lega Nord. Even before its recent electoral 
triumph at the municipal elections in June 1993 (including Milan), the 
Lega Nord, by undermining the ruling DC, made alternance possible in
gaining influence. The Italian subgroup is known under the name Gladio, the gladia­
tor’s sword. See Franco Ferraresi, “A secret structure codenamed Gladio,” in Stephen 
Heilman and Gianfranco Pasquino (eds), Italian Politics: A Review. Volume 7 
(London: Pinter Publishers, 1992), pp. 29-48.
21 Giuseppe Sacco, “Italien im Umbruch,” Europa Archiv, vol. 47, no. 12 (25 June 
1992) p. 338.
22 Giuseppe Sacco, “Italian im Umbruch”, p. 342 (my translation), implying 
apparently also the “democratic” MSI.
23 Angelo Codevilla, “A Second Italian Republic?,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no.3 



























































































The implosion o f clientelistic Italy in the 1990s 11
Italian politics.24
Let us summarise the main thrust of the argument. The Italian politi­
cal system mirrors the Cold War bipolarity. The post-wall system 
undermines the mainly ideological legitimacy on which the system was 
built. Thereby, the government is confronted with the emergence of 
several previously repressed actors, as for instance new parties and an 
independent judiciary. The triggers, namely the withdrawal of electoral, 
industrial, and indeed criminal support for the parties rang the death 
knell of the Italian First Republic.
The implosion of a consociational-clientelistic system
The following account attempts to show that the preceding explanation, 
although not lacking in insight, falls to give a coherent and complete 
account of what is happening in Italy. It tries to make plausible the 
thesis that the changes in Italy could have happened in any international 
context short of heightened East-West conflict or war. It is the implo­
sion of a clientelistic-consociational system. The increasingly economic 
or distributive legitimacy has been undermined by dynamics within 
clientelistic networks and compounded by the acute fiscal and financial 
crisis of embedded liberalism. This section will provide a short 
introduction first to the consociational and then to the clientelistic 
system in Italy.25
The post-Cold War reading of present changes within Italy stresses 
domestic polarisation and the inhibited likelihood of alternation in 
government because the main opposition party was excluded for inter­
national reasons. In fact, the system was from early on characterised by 
a covert collusion of interests within a wide-spread spoils system. 
Therefore, Italy has sometimes been compared to what is called a “con­
sociational democracy” (Lijphart)26 or Konkordanzdemokratie/Pro-
24 At times, however, alternance is still conceived as excluding the left. See 
Giuseppe Sacco, “Italie. Les trois vies des ligues régionales”, Politique Etrangère, vol. 
58, no. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 161-62. He also argues that the Lega Nord is becoming 
a “new” DC, “hopefully” able to establish a new public ethic on which to compete 
with other new movements.
25 For a differently focused, but compatible analysis of Italy in the 1990s, see 
Mario Caciagli, “Italie 1993. Vers la Seconde République,” Revue Française de 
Science Politique, vol. 43, no. 2 (Avril 1993), pp. 229-56.




























































































porzdemokratie, such as Austria. The conditions for the development of 
such systems include:27
- segmented or “pillared” (verzuild/versdult) societies based on ethnic,
political or religious divisions;
- little contact between the pillars, but regular exchange between their
elites;
- a combination of intense verbal antagonism (to uphold the cohesion)
and cooperative behaviour at the top;
- the possibility of foreign threats to exploit internal cleavages;
- a learning process where elites found a modus vivendi to uphold
national unity, often prompted by common experiences such as war. 
The Italian system never corresponded to the ideal type of consociatio- 
nal democracy, because there was no alternation, nor an embracing 
ideology of social partnership, nor what has been called Allgemeinkoali- 
tionsfahigkeit, literally “the general capacity to join a coalition”. This 
does not mean, however, that many of the individual features that are 
linked to consociationalism were not present in Italy.
The system was established from the 1950s. Although overtly 
engaged in ideological battles, the leading parties co-arranged the 
parliamentary committees, which were controlled by party leaders. The 
fact that ninety per cent of the laws emanating from the Italian 
Parliament were voted unanimously indicates the accommodation of 
oppositional wishes in the pre-parliamentary stage. Overt ideological 
conflict did not imply exclusion.28 Indeed, the particular articulation 
of overt and covert politics can be seen as the basic characteristic for 
understanding the Italian system.29 Consociationalism reigned in the 
covert field. Conciliation took place whenever politics were decided 
beyond the public spotlights, as in the local councils. Increasingly, the 
dominating DC had to offer the spoils system to other parties and
Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, voi. X, no. 1 (Aprii 1980), pp. 73-123.
27 For the following, see Gerhard Lehmbruch, “Konkordanzdemokratien im inter- 
nationalen System. Ein Paradigma fiir die Analyse von internen und externen Bedin- 
gungen politischer Systeme,” in Ernst-Otto Czempiel (ed.) Die anachronistische 
Souveranilat (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1969), pp. 139-63.
28 Dwayne Woods, “The Centre No Longer Holds: The Rise of Regional Leagues 
in Italian Politics,” West European Politics, voi. 15, no. 2 (April 1992), p. 64.
SSee especially Alessandro Pizzorno, “Categorie per una crisi,” MicroMega, no. 



























































































The implosion o f clientelistic Italy in the 1990s 13
eventually also to the left opposition. First, to the PSI at the end of the 
1960s and with the “historical compromise” to the PCI in the 1970s. 
Thus, heads of public companies, the public TV channels, and other 
posts became part of a proportional spoils system. The more participants 
in the game, the more posts were created to accommodate them. These 
posts turned into “customs offices” to tax the economic and financial 
flows within Italian society.
But the Italian system could only very roughly be described by mere 
consociationalism. The political stalemate in Rome (no government 
without the DC, no opposition without the PCI, no rule without both 
together), had to be consistently protected and stabilised. Whereas some 
countries resorted to corporatist answers, Italy developed a dualistic 
clientelistic system. In an implicit contract, an externally-oriented 
economic sector (in the North), and a domestically-oriented economic 
sector, increasingly public and service-oriented (mainly in the South) 
were accommodated. Clientelism managed domestic consent in a seg­
mented society and buffered the effects of the necessary opening to the 
European and wider international system. In this respect, Italy shares 
some features of “small states in world markets”: “Avoiding policies of 
protection and of structural transformation equally, they combine inter­
national liberalisation with domestic compensation.”30 Yet, clientelism 
being more heterogeneous than corporatist regimes, domestic consent 
became disproportionately dependent on finance.
The key to the post-war settlement (initially DC rule) is the use of 
state resources to finance consensus. Since the farmers were dependent 
upon and well controlled via the Coldiretto, the farmers’ agency, the 
regime needed to accommodate especially the emerging middle classes. 
In the South, this meant the creation of a network of public companies 
and para-state associations like those for public housing and 
constructions (for the urban employed), the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno 
(for companies). In the 1950s, when the DC tried to become a mass 
party, the southern local elites were replaced with, or recycled as, party 
officials at all levels of public and economic life to allow for the 
functioning of this patronage-based system of distribution.31 Later,
30 Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets. Industrial Policy in Europe 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 39.




























































































other parties created their “assistential networks”. In the north, the 
regime tacitly consented to widespread tax evasion, which benefitted 
small and medium-sized business.32
Similarly to other European countries, the structural changes of urba­
nisation, industrialisation, mass education and communication, made the 
recourse to ideological and religious allegiances progessively less effect­
ive. The resulting escalation both of a widening consociational cooption 
at the peak of the regime and the extension of patronage and clientelis- 
tic links at its base was feasible asjong as the party rev enues kept pace 
with demand. Yet between 1965 and 1975, the budget started to run up 
serious deficits. Although fiscal pressure was increased (reaching 44% 
of the GNP in 1991), the debt got out of hand. If Italy did not have a 
very high domestic saving rate (partly linked to tax evasion), which 
allowed a predominantly internal financing of the debt, there would 
have been the risk of the “debt trap”, the subjugation of national poli­
cies to international control for the rescheduling of the debt. External 
independence was, however, traded for relatively high interest rates on 
Treasury Bonds, which, in turn, aggravated the debt. In the 1980s, the 
accumulated public debt became bigger than the entire annual GNP. In 
1991, 95% of fiscal income had to be spent just to cover interest.33
Party finances are not entirely dependent on state expenditure, but 
in the recent recession, there has been a “private” cash crash. When the 
clientelistic system started to crumble, the cooptation of the middle clas­
ses (North and South) had trouble surviving. With a political system un­
able to mobilise wider groups under a collective goal, the middle 
classes split./The de-solidarisation has different origins and effects 
throughout the Italian system, as we will analyse in more detail below. 
Yet, as Massimo Paci points out, the recent success of the Lega Nord 
can be seen as an inner struggle of the middle class, the northern 
middle class, modern, upwardly mobile, and private sector breaking 
their implicit contract with the southern and relatively more public 
sector middle class.34
Teoria Politica, vol. IX, no. 1 (1993), pp. 43-44. This is also the intermediate period 
when the mafia submitted to DC rule. See below Table 2a, 2b.
12 Dwayne Woods, “The Rise of the Italian Regional Leagues,” p. 63.
33 Percy Allum, “Cronaca di una morte annunciata,” pp. 46-47.
34 Massimo Paci, “Classi sociali e società post-industriale in Italia,” Stato e 



























































































The implosion o f clientelistic Italy in the 1990s 15
Had the legitimacy crisis been mainly ideological, as the post-Cold 
War hypothesis suggests, the return to “normality” would have displa­
ced the traditional bipolar divide in Italian political discourse. Yet, it 
has simply been reproduced, as seen in its successful mobilisation 
during the recent electoral campaigns. The post-wall argument plays an 
important role for the left, which wants its dream to come true that after 
the Cold War, it will gain the long overdue access to power.35 On the 
right, it serves as the repeated proof against “neo-communism”.
In brief, the recent Italian changes must be seen in the context of a 
political economy at the beginning of the 1990s that has seen the 
exacerbation of three financial crises: (1) of the Italian clientelistic 
Welfare State; (2) of the cartelised party-system; and (3) of the indus­
trial structure in the recent globalisation of production.36 The particular 
articulation of covert and overt politics collapsed.
The following account also shows that those who see the main trig­
ger in the implosion of the partitocrazia underplay the extent to which 
the so-called civil society is linked to the entire system. Civil society, 
far from being subjugated by an all-embracing political class, has been 
successfully coopted into a system of common interests which has turn­
ed most Italians, whether consciously or not, into accomplices of the 
system.37 38Second, with the interlocking of the networks, where media­
tion is carried out by actors in parties, companies, organized criminal 
groups, or administrations, where rule is less vertical than trasversale, 
the concept of partitocrazia can only touch one aspect of the system.36
3. The self-sustaining networks of the covert/overt 
articulation of politics
The following section will analyse in more detail four specific networks 
that have been the main articulations of the overt/covert Italian system.
35 Giampaolo Pansa has rightly ridiculed the left’s tendency to see the reason for 
its defeat not in itself, but in the Fodria (le Forze Oscure della Reazione in Agguato, 
“the obscure reactionary forces lying in wait”) in “Manualetto per non fare il Cretino 
di Sinistra”, L ’Espresso, voi. XXXIX, no. 49 (6-12 December 1993), p. 50.
36 For this last argument, see also Enzo Mingione, “Italy: resurgence of region­
alism,” International Affairs (London), voi. 69, no. 2 (April 1993), pp. 310-18.
37 Alfio Mastropaolo, “Democrazia postpolitica e caso Italiano,” Teoria Politica, 
voi. Vili, no. 3 (1992), p. 27.




























































































“Italy” is here seen as a particular case in a more general adaptation 
and legitimation crisis common to many European countries in the new 
IPE of globalised production, communication and finance. To start a 
section devoted to explain Italian changes with a title on “covert action” 
might seem just another example of a well-known Italian illness, name­
ly the resort to conspiracy theories, so-called dietrologia or dietrismo 
(literally “behindism”). This is the idea, that there is always a hidden 
cause behind the apparently inexplicable. Yet, the four networks are 
quite visible, institutionalised and often analyzed. They are “covert” 
because their main organising principles and exchanges are often illegal 
or immoral. The following explanation is primarily institutional, rather 
than conspiratorial.
The choice of four particular networks is linked to the triggers of the 
changes in Italy. They are the cartel-party network, the associational 
network in the welfare state, organised crime, and the network of family 
business. The section follows a double strategy. First, I want to show 
how the financial crisis blocked the system of material legitimacy on 
which the Italian consensus was built. The stress on the internal 
dynamics of the networks is seen as a countermove to the “Cold War 
argument”. Second, the stress on the institutionalised forms of covert 
networks prepares the ground to apprehend possibilities for peaceful 
change as they are developed in the concluding section. Therefore, the 
internal functioning of the networks, the emergence of new actors, and 
the underlying exchanges are presented at some length before being 
linked with the triggers of the present clientelistic-consociational 
implosion in Italy.
The Italian road to the “cartel-party” and to the “business
politician”
The recent crisis of representation in developed democracies can be 
exemplified by the development of two types of new agents, the cartel 
party and the politico d ’affari (business politician). As will be shown, 
it was not the end of the Cold War overlay which undermined the 
Italian party system, but the intrinsic legitimacy crisis of the 
Parteienstaat.
With economic development and social differentiation, the Italian 
mass parties became both weaker and stronger with regard to their main 



























































































The implosion o f clientelistic Italy in the 1990s 17
able to aggregate and pursue general demands of the groups that identi- ^  
fied with them, both because identification receded and (less for Italy) 
because they had to compete with the increasing number of associations 
that lobby for particular requests. On the other hand, parties still keep 
and profit from the monopoly in their function of delegation, that is, the 
recruitment of the political personnel for occupying decision making 
posts.39 40The extension of the government’s prerogatives provokes a 
plethora of new posts in public and semi-public organisations.
It is this mismatch between the declining capacity to transmit 
demands and the rising public delegation capacity of the major parties 
that partly explains an increasing isolation of the political class from its 
sources of legitimation and its subsequent legitimacy crisis. Since they 
lost the capacity for group demand transmission, the increasingly 
fragmented parties built their success on pushing for very particular 
demands. To permit these particularistic and localistic links, party 
factions (correnti), in turn, organised the colonisation of civil society.411 
This was facilitated by the lacking alternation of governments which 
gave the DC and its allies the luxury of fragmenting and organising the 
systematic spoils system.
One can see this as just another expression of the change from the 
ideal type of a mass-party, identifying groups in a common ideology, 
to catch-all parties in a continuous quest for mobile voters. Yet, the r 
party-political class has lost most of its capacity to mediate between 
civil society and the state and has ended up “'becoming a separated 
body from civil society”41 altogether. Indeed, it became part of the 
state itself. From being brokers of different interests, parties turned into 
actors that created the institutional and normative environment most 
conducive to their own reproduction, including the massive use of 
public financing (either directly or via systematic spoils and patronage 
appointments which include opposition parties).42 This evolution which
39 For this and the following point, see Alessandro Pizzorno (1969) “Per un’analisi 
teorica dei partiti politici in Italia,” in /  soggetti del pluralismo. Classi, partiti e 
sindacati (Bologna: il Mulino, 1980), pp. 39-42.
40 Alessandro Pizzorno (1971) “I due poteri dei partiti,” in /  soggetti del 
pluralismo. Classi, partiti e sindacati, pp. 53-54.
41 Gianfranco Pasquino, “Partiti, società civile, istituzioni e il caso italiano,” Stato 
e Mercato, no. 8 (August 1983), pp. 192-93 (my translation).




























































































has been observed for decades in some Western democracies, has re­
cently been called the emergence of “cartel parties”, a system of “inter- 
party collision in which the need for collective organisational survival 
appears to assume priority over individual partisan gains or losses (...) 
It is through the state that parties have been able to create their 
cartel”43 (see Table 1).
The organisational change of parties went hand in hand with a 
change in personnel. A new type of actor, the “business politician”, has 
emerged. A part of the political class has become specialised in a part­
icular trade. They organise the hidden exchanges and become the privil­
eged intermediaries of democratic systems that are structurally vulner­
able to corruption. Alessandro Pizzorno derives this vulnerability of 
democracies from the simple fact that mediation is done not by state 
officials, but by private persons.44 Although some countries allow for 
public financing (of parties), the financing is mainly private. One of the 
consequences is that the same agent who takes up the task of political 
mediation also organises its financing, hence the inherent risk of 
corruption.
Pizzorno’s point is that once a system has been penetrated by practi­
ces of corruption, the motivation and faculties necessary to be efficient, 
change. Different personnel will be attracted to become the mediators. 
In the ideal type democracy, mediation is about identifying and inter­
preting societal demands that will be defended via the acquisition of 
public positions. In a corrupted system, political success depends on 
other abilities. Some politicians will be chosen for their competenza 
d’illegalita: the gathering of information through which illegal advant­
ages can be drawn from administrative actions, and through the estab­
lishment of a network of interested administrators, politicians and 
private persons willing to run and/or to cover the risk of the illegal 
transaction.
deplored for Germany already on the eve of the Great Coalition. Karl Jaspers, Wohin 
treibt die Bundesrepublik? Tatsachen, Gefahren, Chancen (Munich: Piper, 1966), in 
particular pp. 127-140.
43 Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization: The 
Emergence of the Cartel Party” (Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, 
University of Limerick, 30 March-4 April 1992), p. 20. Of course, features of different 
parties co-exist.
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Table 1. The Models of Party and Their Characteristics (Source: Richard Katz & 
Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization”, p. 36). Reprinted with 




























































































Apart from the lower level broker or middleman, this leads to a 
highly qualified figure of modern democratic politics: the “business 
politician”, who links private business, traditional political mediation 
with a trustworthy and personal network of persons willing to act ille­
gally. Through two mechanisms, this class will potentially crowd out 
the publicly working politician. First, this new fraction of the “political” 
class will reinvest their social (network) and financial capital to accu­
mulate even more political “purchasing power” which increases their 
ability to offer advantages. Second, this political class tends to install 
what Pizzorno calls a “vicious circle of arrogance”: the appearance of 
possessing the power to act arbitrarily induces people to ask for perso­
nal favours. This, in turn, enhances the “representativity” of politicians 
and their chance to prevail in the public sphere. This higher political 
authority will feed back into enhanced arrogance.45
These business politicians organise the “corrupt” sections in the 
above-mentioned cartel-party system. First, they display a tendency to 
enlarge the illegal transaction by coopting those not directly involved 
whose silence must be assured — and compensated. In the Italian vers­
ion of consociationalism, integrating the opposition very often meant 
exactly this: silence for political alliances or for a part of the bribes, or 
the division of positional and financial spoils. Tangentopoli or “bribes- 
' ville” is the symbol not just of a generalised habit of corruption. It is 
a system: whenever major public works were contracted, entrepreneurs 
automatically had to pay preestablished percentages of the total pro­
ject’s volume. The bribe was split up among the parties following 
preestablished quotas. Public works/subsidies become part and parcel of 
an underground exchange to ease the parties’ and other budgets.46
Second, the political class has an interest in reducing the impact of 
the electoral contest on personnel change. This can be done in two 
' ways: horizontal cooptation and vertical selective admission. One the
45 The expression “arrogance” is the one that the interviewed people actually used. 
It refers to the self-assured appearance that makes us presuppose absolutely unscrupu­
lous behaviour. See for this point also Donatella della Porta, “Corruzione e carriere 
politiche: immagini dei 'politici d’affari’”, Stato e Mercato, no. 34 (April 1992), pp. 
47ff.
46 It is difficult to give exact figures for the volume of bribes and kickbacks. 
Roughly 10% of a contract’s value hat) to be paid. One estimate talks about $US 4 



























































































The implosion o f clientelistic Italy in the 1990s 21
one hand, one can assure that the responsible positions will be held by 
“trustworthy” people. On the other hand, the parties, i.e. the monopoly 
providers of public spoils, will control newcomers among their own 
ranks. Here again, the Italian lack of renewal has been legendary. 
Senator (for life) Giulio Andreotti is the obvious case in point: he has 
been a senior member of the Italian political administration since 1947, 
seven times head of government and thirty-three times a minister. If 
these two closures work, the system has become “society-proof’ and 
politicians have indeed turned state administration into their fiefdom.47 48
Having established the functioning of the Italian party system, we 
can now turn to the question of what triggered its sudden demise. It can 
be argued that this form of party system develops two main internal ■ 
contradictions: the general loss of legitimacy, and the rise of anti-system j  
parties.
Firstly, two indicators show that the party system has lost legiti­
macy. On the one hand, the recent stress on referenda is typical for 
political systems whose party-fragmentation and cartel bargaining make 
parties difficult to use as transmission belts; referenda become the direct 
link to the political system where representation is blocked. On the 
other hand, starting with Pertini, the Italian Presidency has changed 
from a merely representative function to become an increasingly popu­
lar reference point over and above the parties; even more explicitly than 
in the case of von Weizsâcker in Germany. Thus, in the debate on the 
election date, President Scalfaro dissolved parliament once the electoral 
law was passed.4* Criticised by his own party for not respecting the 
democratically elected parliament, he answered that he has also to 
respect the sovereign’s (people) will for change as expressed in the 
latest referenda.
Secondly, since elections only have a limited impact in this pre-ar­
ranged system, the cartel-parties’ attempt to both limit societal demands 
and to exclude newcomers from the cartel might provoke a more fero­
cious anti-system critique once the party-system loses legitimacy. In this 
respect, the Lega Nord has become the Italian equivalent of other right-
47 The most “economic” working of such a system will try to make the lower level 
brokers compete and to cartelize or oligopolize the higher echelons.
48 When the Senate refused to lift parliamentary immunity from the former 
Minister of Health De Lorenzo, Scalfaro declared in October 1993 that if the electoral 




























































































libertarian anty-system movements. The Lega is located between the 
moderate right of the German Statt-Partei and the radical populist right, 
such as the Front National, the Republikaner, or Haider’s FPO. Both 
share a neo-liberal (anti-statist and anti-tax) economic programme which 
is combined with changing (and in Italy declining) emphasis on trad­
itional extreme right-wing topics (law and order, xenophobia and a new 
isolationism within Fortress Europe). Their electoral success is linked 
to their ability to forge an alliance between both the losers of recent 
structural changes, captured by populist xenophobic and anti-establish­
ment slogans, and some of the winners (in the private sector) attracted 
by the neo-liberal programme.49 In contrast to the left-libertarian 
response of the green movements, they appeal to the “new ego-centrism 
which prevails throughout the advanced western world.”50 51
In summary, a blocked and isolated party rule is one factor in the 
disruption of the Italian system. This blockage is the most extreme form 
of a tendency, also visible in Germany, to turn democracies into a Par- 
teienstaat.5' The resulting structural crisis of representation and the 
emergence of a new actor, the business politician, have built up with no 
proved link to the international bipolar overlay. The recent electoral 
crisis of the established parties can therefore not be reduced to its end.
49 The cartel party system has provoked different protest votes attracting voters 
from the entire political spectrum. Today, this does apply so much to some Green 
movements, as to the Lega Nord. Despite their electoral “catch-all” appeal, the latter’s 
programmatic identity mixes two different, but definitely right-wing traditions of the 
conservative and neo-liberal kind. It is therefore misleading to present it as “centrist”, 
as do David Hine and Vincent della Sala, “The Italian General Election of 1992,” 
Electoral Studies, vol. 11, no. 4 (December 1992), p. 365.
50 For a succinct analysis of the origins of these movements, see Hans-Georg Betz, 
“The New Politics of Resentment. Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western 
Europe,” Comparative Politics, vol. 25, no. 4 (July 1993). The quotation is from p. 
424. The “neo-materialist” programme of the Lega has developed in a direction to go 
to power in Rome in order to protect the North in a “sort of autoprotectionist neoliber­
alism”. For this argument, see Ilvo Diamanti, La Lega. Geografia, storia e sociologia 
di un nuovo suggetto politico (Roma: Donzelli, 1993), p. 13, 95, which is an excellent 
analysis of the social and electoral origins and evolution of the multiple Leagues.
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Welfare State all’Italiana
The welfare state regime represents another self-reproducing subsystem, 
whose assistential-clientelistic functioning underpins the system of 
Italian legitimation. Following the general approach of this chapter, this 
section explores the internal dynamics of this subsystem and examines 
then possible impact of the crisis of the welfare state on recent changes 
in Italy. I argue that the welfare state system has proved relatively 
enduring, albeit only by “successfully” postponing adaptation. The 
present financial crisis increases the pressure on the solidarity links 
within the system. In the present distributional battle, the North-South 
welfare transfer seems to be the most feeble link.
Following the distinction by Titmuss,52 three types of Welfare 
States can be distinguished: (1) the residual welfare model o f social 
policy which is a system of unconditional emergency assistance, design­
ed to be temporary. The US comes close to this system; (2) the indus­
trial achievement-performance model of social policy which is a partial 
corrective to the market. It is meritocratic and “particularistic” in so far 
as it is organised on the basis of an insurance system which links 
welfare provisions to contributions. This is the ideal type of the conti­
nental European system; and (3) the institutional redistributive model 
of social policy which operates external to the market logic and presup­
poses poverty to be a permanent condition of industrial societies if not 
counteracted by decommodified social institutions. This Anglo- 
Scandinavian system is based on the provision of universal entitlements 
to achieve redistributive effects.
The Italian system essentially falls into the continental category. A 
recent Titmuss-inspired typology stresses the impact of the welfare state 
on social stratification. Here corporatism — and Italy is once again the 
paradigmatic case — is built around “occupational groupings seeking 
to uphold traditionally recognised status distinctions and us[ing] these 
as the organisational nexus for society and economy.”53 A specific 
characteristic is, however, the subordination of the welfare intervention 
to a political, and increasingly party-political, logic. The result is a
52 Richard M. Titmuss, Essays on the Welfare State (London: Allen and Unwin, 
1958).
53 G0sta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds o f Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: 




























































































system of much higher unequal and arbitrary treatment, a system of 
“particularistic clientelism”.54
As in Bismarck’s Germany, the Italian welfare system emerged in 
the last century to appease the rising labour movement. In the inter war 
period, it attempted to integrate the rural working class and later, during 
fascism, the middle class. Yet, it was not matched by a strong associa- 
tional voluntaristic network as in Germany. In particular during the 
fascist period, the split between the centralised control over welfare 
organisation and its particularistic, that is, corporate-dependent 
management, were exacerbated.55 The organisation of welfare around 
insurance systems and its management via a selectively privileging 
system of a multitude of public bodies (end) was to be taken up and 
further institutionalised by the political system after World War II. This 
administration can be exemplified by the extreme case of the Italian 
pension system.
Italy has thirteen major pension schemes organised according to 
occupational categories. That is much more than other continental 
welfare regimes, such as, for instance, the Netherlands and Switzerland 
with their unified systems. Whereas those systems practice inter- 
occupational transfers, in Italy, this only applies to some (poorer) 
occupational categories. Lawyers, doctors, managing directors, journal­
ists, artists, to mention some, have autonomous pension funds. This 
means that although compulsory public insurance covers nearly all cases 
leaving very little space to private insurance, the systems is sufficiently 
varied to allow very pluralist treatment — not to take care of different 
needs, but just for the clientelistic legislation and application of law.56 
The tendency is to allow an independent scheme for any category 
(electorally or otherwise) strong enough to claim one. This is done by 
the typical leggine (little laws), which is the attempt to exempt or 
“correct” general laws in favour of particular needs.
54 This characterisation is used by G0sta Esping-Andersen. See also Ugo Ascoli, 
“Il sistema italiano di welfare,” in Ugo Ascoli (ed.) Welfare State A ll’Italiana (Bari: 
Laterza, 1984), p. 17.
55 Massimo Paci, “Il sistema di Welfare italiana tra tradizione clientelare e 
prospettive di riforma,” in Ugo Ascoli (ed.) Welfare State A ll’Italiana (Bari: Laterza, 
1984), pp. 314f.
56 Chiara Saraceno, “Alla ricerca di una difficile legittimazione: il welfare 
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Clientelism, however, means more than attempts to appease different 
social groups: the welfare system has increasingly become part of the 
party-feudal spoils and finance system. On the party level, this means 
that the heads of these bodies will be divided among parties and party 
factions in order to finance the party elite. By offering services, they 
can build up local clienteles to support their political careers. An 
indicator of welfare state type of clientelism is the (mis)use of public 
money in a political-assistential market, as exemplified by the alloca­
tion of civil invalidity pensions and rural unemployment funds.”
Contrary to occupational invalidity, there is a system of civil 
invalidity pensions where allocation depends not only on standard 
criteria, but on a negotiation between the person applying for it and the 
responsible ente. The law requires the ente to take into account the 
“social-economic conditions of the area of residence”. During the 
1970s, this became a hidden system of financing unemployment and 
socialising the costs of redundancy. Since the request has to be made 
by a representative body of the occupational category (e.g., trade- 
unions) or the equivalent, a patronage as it were, this patronage could 
offer special treatment if the request for welfare were to be exchanged 
for votes for a particular party or faction. Today, 1.145 million people 
are registered as civil invalids.57 8
A further example is the assistance geared to rural areas. Whereas 
during the 1950s and 1960s, the control of these benefits required part­
ies (and increasingly also trade-unions that exchange these favours for 
support) to penetrate the responsible bureaucracies, from the 1970s on­
wards, the task of assigning these benefits shifted to parties themselves. 
This can also be done as a “block” exchange, that is, a favour granted 
to an entire category. In 1962, when the government decided to ration­
alise the registration procedures for rural benefits, the decision met with
57 For the following, see Maurizio Ferrera, !l Welfare State in Italia. Sviluppo e 
crisi in prospettiva comparata (Bologna: II Mulino, 1984), pp. 202ff.
58 The major parties “consociationally” indulged in using this clientelistic system: 
the regions with the highest percentage of civil invalids are Umbria (PCI or followers) 
and Abruzzo (DC). Designed to deter the circa 2 million (!) new requests, a recent law 
stipulates tighter checks and requires pensions received illegally to be reimbursed to 
the state. Although justified and overdue, this does not solve the social problem which 
generated this misuse of welfare measures, nor does it touch thosee disposing of 
patronage who made the system work. See Miriam Mafai, “Italia, Belpaese d’invalidi,” 




























































































a wave of resistance in southern Italy. The registrations were frozen. 
Hence, obsolete lists including emigrants, the deceased, and the wives 
of wealthy men, determined entitlement to benefits.
In other words, welfare provision was transformed into a policy of 
income maintenance, where the attribution of benefits is not only 
guaranteed by standard provisions, but by the capacity to use political 
intermediaries.59 Since assistance is given not in the form of services, 
but in the form of money, the transactions of the clientelistic exchange 
are made easier. It is an “assistential market” in which public institu­
tions are successfully circumvented.60
In order to judge the present crisis of this particular welfare-state 
regime, it is therefore important to weigh up both the corporatist logic 
and the specific clientelistic features. Welfare regimes have to answer 
the current demands for improved services so as not to alienate the mid­
dle-class on which it relies for its funding and which has expanded and 
differentiated due to the changes in productive and financial structu­
res.61 The question is, how strong will Italy’s “welfare backlash” be 
when the middle-class revolt against its perceived sacrifice and ask for 
an “balancing-out” between contributions made and services re­
ceived?62
Within the corporatist regime, a retreat by the welfare state is 
difficult to implement as it is linked to the very logic of the regime. 
Since it aims to preserve the existing pattern of social stratification, a 
change implies the overturning of social hierarchies and an attack on 
particular institutional defences and privileges. According to Ferrera, 
Italy is characterised by many of those procedures that comparative 
studies show that make fiscal opposition rather unlikely. These are the
59 Gloria Regonini, “Il sistema pensionistico: risorse e vincoli,” in Ugo Ascoli 
(ed.) Welfare State A ll’Italiana (Bari: Laterza, 1984) p. 107, notes that the pension 
system allows employers to evade their part in the contributions, too. This happens 
through exempt “in times of economic strain” or via tacit acceptance of large welfare 
fiscal evasion.
60 Maurizio Ferrera, II Welfare State in Italia, p. 211.
61 Massimo Paci, “Classi sociali e società post-industriale in Italia,” pp. 208-11.
62 For the self-perpetuating features of the welfare state, not a general demise of 
the welfare state, but the possible downgrading of more universalist or more cor­
poratist tendencies toward a residual type is at stake. For this argument and empirical 
evidence of de facto continuing support for welfare state measures, see: Christopher 



























































































The implosion of clientelistic Italy in the 1990s 27
use of relatively hidden formes of financing (such as the predominance 
of indirect over direct taxation) and the distribution of welfare benefits, 
the meritocratic system built on insurance schemes that seem relatively 
fair to contributors, and the existence of a strong pro-welfare lobby 
(usually strong labour movements). But he notes two specific Italian 
characteristics: the continuous extension of benefits financed via the 
public debt and the tacit, or even systematic, creation of loopholes that 
ease fiscal evasion. This double procedure of leaving many parts of the 
population highly dependent on supplementary income, and of allowing 
the cost to be evaded or hidden, has coopted large parts of the 
population into the system making them eager defenders of the status 
quo ante. This includes — and that makes the system even more inert
— both the poor clientele (or at least those recognised as such) and the 
relatively wealthy independent professionals who could: (1) evade the 
fiscal pressure and are secured via regular amnesties for past evasions; 
and (2) use the welfare system for socialising some of their costs.
Hence, the welfare backlash has remained limited. The clientelistic- 
particularist regime makes a neo-liberal “reform” of the welfare re­
gime’s financial (budget deficit) and fiscal (tax collection and tacitly ac­
cepted fraud) crisis improbable or inefficient. The present deadlock re­
sults where the middle classes need special treatment at a time when the 
state must both improve its budget and its services. Typical of Italy, one 
proposed solution splits the welfare regime along the North-South divi­
de, rendering the middle class in the North less responsible for develop­
ment in the South (regional tax autonomy) in order to uphold or im­
prove the system’s performances in the North.63 The corporatist logic 
remains untouched, the fiscal and financial crisis temporarily resolved
- in the North. In this respect, the Lega Nord’s programme represents 
a case of typical Italian trasformismo: the first Republic has to change, 
in order to allow the basic structure (in the North) to remain intact.
63 With regard to the health sector, the 1992 Finance Bill (Law 412/1991) stipulat­
es, that (1) budget overruns in the health sector will no longer be financed ex post by 
central government, but by the regions, and (2) the regions obtain money in such a 
way as to allow an equal level of assistance. Since the regions in the North with the 
best health services are also spending much more, they would be restricted in their 
spending and public funds channelled from the North and Centre to the South. Such 
a system de facto asks for a fiscal autonomy to uphold the level of assistance in the 
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Managing illegal markets: organised crime and party clienteles
As in the case with the political system, organised crime (Sicily’s 
Mafia, Calabria’s N ’drangheta, Campania’s Camorra, Puglia’s Sacra 
Corona Unita) has shown increasing signs of an authority-crisis. On 7 
December 1990, 27 businessmen in Capo d’Orlando (Sicily) decided not 
to pay the racket any longer and created the first “association of anti­
racket entrepreneurs.” In 1991, special laws were passed to protect the 
pentiti, i.e. former mafiosi who collaborate with the police. An Italian 
FBI (“Direzione investigativa antimafia”) and an integrated anti-Mafia 
prosecution, called the “superprocura” (“Direzione nazionale antimafia”) 
were established.64 On 17 January 1992, the former mayor of Palermo, 
Vito Ciancimino, was convicted of mafia association and condemned to 
ten years of prison. The discovery of financial flows allow valid links 
to be made between the whole of the Italian clientelistic system: 
Tangentopoli “meets”, so to say, the mafia via the business politicians. 
The mafia reacted with escalated violence which started just before the 
elections with the assassination of an important political mediator, Salvo 
Lima (former mayor of Palermo and member of Andreotti’s corrente) 
on 13 March 1992. Two major mafia prosecutors, Giovanni Falcone (23 
May) and Paolo Borsellino (19 July), died with several members of 
their escorts. Finally, another mediator, Ignazio Salvo, suspected to be 
Andreotti’s link to the mafia, was killed.
When the two leading mafia bosses, Giuseppe Madonia (10 Septem­
ber 1992), and Toto Riina (15 January 1993) were captured, the fall of 
the wall, was again cited as a cause for the crumbling mafia system
The mafia is also a victim of the end of the Cold War, of the old bipolar 
system ... The mafia has always been a force that brought water to the 
mills of anticommunism. Now, since the East-West bipolarity has come to 
an end, it somehow serves less than before: sustaining it has become more 
difficult, the political alibis have been dropped.65
64 For details, see Pino Arlacchi and Gianni di Gennaro (director of the DIA), “Le 
techniche antimafia di una polizia speciale”, MicroMega, no. 3 (June-August 1993), 
pp. 69-79.
65 Luciano Violante (PDS), at the time President of the anti-mafia commission of 
the Parliament, quoted in Stefano Brusadelli and Massimo Franco, “Uninominale sulla 
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Yet, the mafia’s crisis started well before the end of the Cold War, as 
most visibly shown by the “maxi-processo” at the beginning 1980s 
when several hundred mafiosi were convicted. There are two main 
reasons for this: (1) the creation of a judiciary organisation in small 
pools and attacking the mafia’s weak spot, namely its dependence on 
hot money bankers for laundering dirty money has certainly helped to 
undermine mafia authority; (2) the reorganisation of the mafia via the 
highly decentralized and not territorially fixable drug business, contra­
dicts the traditional rules of inter-clan relations based on fixed spheres 
of influence. This had two consequences. On the one hand, it provoked 
an attempt at trans-clan centralisation and of increased violence. On the 
other hand, it diffused knowledge about the system. Both together stand 
for the difficult management of structural and cultural changes of 
organised crime that have very probably triggered widespread désolida­
risation expressed in the form of the pentitismo.
The mafia organisation has become a transnational enterprise of a 
particular kind whose global reach links illegal and legal (especially 
financial) markets with a territorial power base in which the mafia takes 
on public functions. This change can only be understood in the context 
of the recent expansion of international drug and hot-money markets. 
There would have been no successful mafia reorganisation without 
“Casino Capitalism.”66
The success of the recent transformation to a “mafia-enterprise” and 
its capacity to become a privileged partner or even to crowd out both 
entrepreneurs on the domestic and international level, as well as the 
party-clientelistic system is based on a series of “productive” 
competitive advantages:67
(1) the deterrence of competitors to remain in/enter markets by violent
means;
(2) the capacity for wage-compression both by the evasion of contribut-
ions/insurance or the non-payment of extra-hours, and by the
suppression of trade-unions;
(3) the easy access to liquid capital, be it narcolire or other illegally
66 See also Letizia Paoli, “Criminalità organizzata e finanza d’avventura,” Ras­
segna Italiana di Sociologia, voi. 34, no. 3 (July-September 1993), pp. 391-423. The 
label refers to Susan Strange’s Casino Capitalism (Oxford: Basii Blackwell, 1986).



























































































3 0 S t e f a n o  G u z z i n i
earned money, credits by banks owned or incorporated into the 
clientelistic system, and by the diversion of public funds.
Mafia enterprises are therefore highly competitive in acquiring and de­
fending market shares and have considerable “comparative advantages” 
in building up monopolies — whose profits will, in turn, be used to 
crowd out other suppliers. By attacking the party-clientelistic market 
from the supply-side, blocking other suppliers, it can interrupt, or use 
for its own ends, the public contract money on which the party-clientel­
istic system was built. The mafia-enterprise can also become a privileg­
ed partner for joint-ventures or subcontracting, because its lower pro­
duction costs and higher “social peace” in production are attractive for 
foreign investors. Finally, the mafia-enterprise can play on the advan­
tages of the (cartelised) domestic market and the fraudulent impact of 
the illegal international division of labour. In Italy, the mafia has used 
public funds to build up a financial machine strong enough to manage 
take-overs (also in close collaboration with party-affiliated financial 
institutions), and investments in the international drug and arms market. 
The profits of these markets have, in turn, been reinvested to bolster 
their domestic position and to crowd out the relatively limited favours 
the party-clientelistic system was able to offer. Nobody outside the 
mafia system has the same capacity to control local job creation and 
thus to legitimate its business (See Table 2a/2b for the historical 
development of the types of mafia organisation).
Given this emergence of a new kind of actor, we can now apprehend 
the network of the mafia system. Generally speaking, the strengths of 
organised crime derive from its ability to control a particular inter­
section between: (1) the transnationalisation of business firms operating 
in illegal markets, be it for the illegal final product (drugs), for the 
illegal transfer (arms), or for an illegal input (clandestine slave labour 
in particular in the textile, leather and construction industries); and (2) 
from the increasing needs of the clientelistic system to distribute and 
guarantee favours, the so-called “inflatjonarv-clientelistic process”. 
Here, organised crime enjoys an advantage with its internal control and 
sanction (at times, murder) apparatus.
The mafia overcomes the trust-problem of illegal markets, by 
guaranteeing exchanges that would not otherwise occur. Once again, it 
is the networking-capacity of the business politicians which is crucial. 



























































































The implosion of clientelistic Italy in the 1990s 31
that makes an illicit deal possible, and another based on guaranteeing 
the deal by linking up actors who might not othersie come into contact 
with each other.
Yet single exchanges are often unstable. The tendency not to co­
operate is high. In order to back the guarantor’s cause, there will be a 
tendency to form networks which recruit particularly reliable persons, 
whose loyalty can be trusted for reasons of socialisation in relatively 
homogeneous groups, such as ethnic or religious communities or the 
cosca of the mafia.68 The other option is violence. Here, business 
politicians usually lack an instrument of coercion. It is precisely at this 
point that (parts of the secret services and) organised crime enters the 
picture. Either the mafioso is a business politician himself and therefore 
has a competitive advantage in such transactions. Or, a business politi­
cian relies on organised crime for eventual sanctions or violent actions. 
Andreotti, for instance, is under investigation for having organised the 
murder of a journalist—via the mafia.
Yet, this entails several inherent weaknesses, namely: (1) the domes­
tic challenge to the mafia through the judiciary system; and (2) internal 
contradictions in the mafia rule of the transnational entrepreneurial kind.
One of the most important power resources and potential weaknesses 
is the capacity to network with business politicians to mediate for pro­
tection on a national and international level.69 The secret masonic 
lodge “P(ropaganda) 2” was such a vitally important link in the network 
because it combined contact with the secret services and public officials 
both in Latin America and Italy.70 In this context, violence is used 
when the mafia’s reliance on business politicians to mediate for protec­
tion against police and judicial prosecution is jeopardised. Mafia bosses, 
when caught, were systematically released, often for purely formal 
reasons, at the Appeal Court under the presidency of a judge nicknamed 
I’amazza-sentenze (“the verdict-killer”). In the appeal following the 
maxi-processo, when some bosses were not released, the political
“  Alessandro Pizzorno, “Lo scambio occulto,” p. 17.
m The capacity to target jurisdictional prosecution — via established networks — 
on competing clans is a major asset in the competition.
70 Pino Arlacchi, “Saggio sui mercati illegali,” respectively p. 415 and p. 417. See 
also R.T. Naylor, Hot Money and the Politics of Debt (New York: The Linden 
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34 S t e f a n o  G u z z i n i
mediator, so the story goes, had to pay: Salvo Lima, former mayor of 
Palermo was assassinated. This was largely perceived as a sign of 
change, because the mafia was normally able to make clients comply 
with their threats or bribes. To kill such a highly placed mediator meant 
that organised crime had lost some of its grip on the political system.
Most importantly, the national and international legal and policy in­
struments have recently started to be adapted to the transnational illegal 
markets. On the domestic level, new legal means have been introduced: 
the extension of covert enquiry; the exclusion of mafia bosses from any 
reduction of penalties; protection for collaborators; confiscation of 
property presumably acquired with illegal money. In particular, the last 
means is not only relatively spectacular, but is also symbolically impor­
tant because it destroys the image of the invincible and powerful mafia 
in which wealth had become a sign of honour/power. On the inter­
national level, a collaboration for the establishment of a financial intelli­
gence network has been started with spectacular results in three sub­
sequent “blitz” as the parallel capturing of organised crime rings in 
different countries are called. Since selling on the market is difficult to 
control, the police has decided to follow the illegal financial flows 
themselves. It uses the dependence of the mafia on bankers of the “hot 
finance” for laundering capital. Finally, the judiciary has used new 
means to sollicit collaboration: the pentiti, by now around 200 former 
mafiosi have been turned into, or have constituted themselves, as 
witnesses.
The other major weakness derives from the adaptation problem of 
a decentralised drug business and a diffused authority with the territorial 
division of traditional mafioso rule.71 This problem causes both a 
spiral of violence in order to retain control and the emergence of the 
previously unthinkable pentiti. Toto Riina and his cosca of the Corleo- 
nesi, heading the Cosa Nostra in the Palermo area with around 90 
families, tried to reorganise the 500 family-businesses of the entire 
mafia. The mafia introduced several centralising features. On the one 
hand, it organised a top-level coordination to defend itself against the 
national and international judiciary and to plan offensives against it.72
71 For this point, I am indebted to Alessandro Pizzorno.
72 For an argument of the vertical concentration of the mafia under the Corleonesi, 
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Furthermore, the Corleonesi sent so-called “ambassadors”, that is, cosca 
members, to join other families and to streamline from within, also by 
force. Whereas the first provoked a reaction from the state, this latter 
double move of integration and violence prompted the resistance of the 
other mafia families. The imperative to control the drug business contra­
dicts the basic principle of the mafia system, namely that of territorial 
“sovereignty” which can not be attacked too much, without provoking 
a general state of war.73 The modern mafia appears to be caught in a 
dilemma: on the one hand, its economic competitiveness depends on 
internal normative constraints that overcome the trust problem of illegal 
markets; on the other hand, the trasnationalisation seems to require a 
centralisation that undermines these very norms.
Family-business under siege
For many, the dawn of the First Republic’s long night started on 17 
February 1992. Mario Chiesa (PSI), a public administrator in Milan, 
was caught in a trap when he received a bribe of $US 4500. After some 
investigation, the initial 4500 became $US 10 million. In a way remi­
niscent of a cathartic collective rite, investigated businessmen started to 
fill up thousands of pages and thus allowed the reconstruction of a vast 
network of Tangentopoli. A month after his arrest, Mario Chiesa started 
to speak. Now, two former mayors of Milan are under arrest, and major 
businessmen have publicly admitted to have paid into the system (and 
to have profited from it).74 The sums generally quoted are around $US 
10 million for De Benedetti (Olivetti) and around $US 40 million for 
Agnelli/Romiti (FIAT). But the record is held by the Enimont deal, 
where the private partner in a private/public joint venture is said to have 
been paid around $US 100 million too much for splitting up. In July 
1993, the general ENI-manager Cagliari and then the former Mont­
edison (Ferruzzi) manager Gardini, committed suicide. Again, the end 
of the Cold War and this juridictional campaign have been repeatedly
Caldarola (supplementary book to L ’Unità, 11 September 1993), p. 83.
73 “Adesso si può vincere” (interview with Pino Arlacchi conducted by Daniele 
Martini), Panorama (24-30 January 1993), special survey “Mafia: ultimo atto?,” p. 
XVII.
74 Since this money came from undeclared private accounts abroad, political 
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linked. Yet, both corruption and trials of a systematic and major scale 
started at the beginning of the 1980s.75
One of the features of the Parteienstaat is its ability to colonise 
other social subsystems. Subsystems that managed to remain autono­
mous can use the party-state for their own purpose. Von Beyme calls 
this “inverse colonisation”: “Where decision power and patronage of 
parties are mounting, those social interests not colonised by the parties 
are increasingly tempted to use these instruments of power via the cor­
ruption of parties.”76 With regard to the Italian case, this presupposes 
a relatively autonomous social sphere and once corruption is installed, 
there is a collusion of interests which makes patronage work.
This relatively autonomous social sphere is not Italian business tout 
court. The Italian productive system is characterised by a double anta­
gonism. The first juxtaposes the largest public sector in the EC/EU and 
private business. Both IRI (Istituto per la Riconstruzione Industriale), 
a state-controlled public company, and FIAT, have a turnover equal to 
4-5% of Italian GDP in 1989. FIAT alone controls directly or indirectly 
60% of the domestic car market, 25% of the entire Italian stock ex­
change capitalisation (around $US 25 billion worth of quoted compan­
ies), and the two major center-right newspapers.77 The second, and for 
our analysis of the triggers of the recent implosion, more important 
dichotomy, is between a few very big enterprises and a lot of small 
firms. Both groups have developed very specific relationships with the 
political system, one on the national, the other on the regional level.
This subsection examines how that the disaffection of business from 
the old system can be understood as an adaptation crisis of the busi­
ness-political mediation systems in times of budget constraints and 
increasing ecomomic competitive pressures. Common to the politico- 
economic bargain of both big and small business with public authorities, 
was the implicit contract which traded a certain international openness 
with state intervention to improve infrastructure, to socialise costs and 
other items of industrial policy. On the one hand, the financial crisis of
75 Maurizio de Luca and Franco Giustolisi, “Gli anni ottanta fra giudici e insabbia­
tori”, MicroMega, no. 2 (April-May 1993), pp. 101-117.
76 Klaus von Beyme, Die politische Klasse im Parteienstaat, p. 91 (my 
translation).
77 OECD, Economie Surveys: Italy (Paris: OECD, 1991), p. 61; Alan Friedman, 



























































































The implosion o f clientelistic Italy in the 1990s 37
the state put a strain on the bargain between the central state and big 
business. Big business, on the other hand, became increasingly con­
cerned by the privatisation programme that the Italian government 
wanted to realise partly in order to balance its budget deficit. The 
explicit governmental attempt thereby to decentralise economic power 
in Italy would have upset the traditionally exclusivist oligarchic control 
of big finance and industry in Italy. On the other hand, the most 
disaffecting parts of small business were initially to be found in 
particular regions of the so-called “Third Italy” whose economic and 
political success is now eroding the cultural and social bases upon 
which these particular systems of localistic mediation rested.
Let us start with the club of Italian big business. In a certain way, 
the oligarchic family structure of (northern) Italian business is a relic of 
the firsTphase of industrialisation with its two main characteristics: the 
preeminence of merchant banks as intermediaries for rare capital and 
the constitution of industrial groups.78 These groups have one characte­
ristic which distinguishes them from their anglo-american counterparts: 
expansion is not achieved through economic concentration and juridical 
mergers, but in the form of a conglomerate of firms which are barely 
reorganised and which keep their identity. The reasons for such an 
undertaking have been hypothesised as an attempt to use the capital of 
the integrated firms, but more importantly for avoiding take-overs and 
for organising a network of alliance. The ultimate aim is to limit control 
to a small number of businessmen who are allowed to join the club 
built mainly by Agnelli, Pirelli, the newcomer De Benedetti and (until 
recently) Gardini. By limiting the power and number of shareholders 
and by cross-linking the properties in a net of holdings, an alliance is 
forged which can mobilise and channel risk capital to anyone in need, 
but where the rules of the game exclude the possibility of a single agent 
taking over the whole. The underlying idea of the club is to orchestrate 
a net of direct and indirect minority voting rights allowing the members 
of the club to maintain control with very small visible stakes. Thereby, 
the levantine construction of holdings completely separates property
78 For the following, see Luciano Cafagna, ’’Gruppi industriali e economie ritarda­



























































































38 S t e f a n o  G u z z i n i
from control.79 To enforce the rules and to coordinate the net, the 
Italian family business has placed the (until recently exclusive) 
merchant bank, Mediobanca, at the centre of the net.
Since its creation nearly 50 years ago, Mediobanca, a public bank, 
has been controled by Enrico Cuccia, “the architect of the Italian 
network of private power.”80 Being the virtual monopoly supplier of 
capital for many years, Cuccia’s initial aim might have been to use the 
public bank to ease the cash problems of Italian industry. But becoming 
the owner of key minority voting rights in companies, he built up, with 
the consent of the club, a spider’s web of firms’ alliances which he 
connects with insurance and banks. Whenever cash is needed, the club 
turns to Cuccia. Paradigmatic of the working of the club (with the 
exception of its publicity), is the FIAT-Libya case which was resolved 
in such a way as to allow members of the club to increase their stake 
in FIAT (Agnelli himself), by swapping money within the system with 
little concern for outside companies or the minority shareholders of the 
club’s companies.81
The relations between the club and either government or small 
business is not without friction. Small and medium enterprises have 
always felt curtailed by the club’s restrictive rules and have turned to 
the DC (and now increasingly to the Lega Nord and to Forza Italia) for 
the protection of their interests. Since the 1950s when the ruling DC 
extended its own clientelistic net over Italy, it has, for its part, become 
a competitior for funds, capital, profits, and personal rents. Aiming at 
financial independence from private business, the DC used public 
companies, among other things, as a rent mechanism for party purposes. 
The relationship between the DC and the club was, and is, of a purely 
utilitarian nature.
Now, due partially to the internationalisation of finance and produc­
tion, the family business has recently shown signs of crises. The first 
is linked to the question of succession. Gianni Agnelli has been forced 
to overrule his own declared aim to step down at the age of seventy- 
five. Since 1988, a “Deng Hsiao Ping-solution”, allows Cuccia, born in
79 For a critique of the company structure in Italy, see Guido Plutino, “Una lezione 
dal baratro,” Mondo Economico, vol. XLVIII, no. 30 (24-30 July 1993), pp. 60-62.
"° Alan Friedman, Agnelli and the Network of Italian Power, p. 89. For a detailed 
account of the links (as for 1988), see p. 88.



























































































The implosion o f clientelistic Italy in the 1990s 3 9
1907, to keep on governing Mediobanca as an “honourary president”. 
The question of succession is highly sensitive, because the covert 
exchanges need very trustworthy mediators, a form of human capital 
which is not easily inherited or delegated.
More important problems are linked, however, to the oligopolisation 
in the OECD. The growing Italian market of the miracolo allowed an 
expansion and concentration that was nationally protected and inter­
nationally relatively competitive. In several sectors, this is no longer the 
case. Olivetti, Pirelli or FIAT have to compete in markets where 
increasingly multinational mergers, joint-ventures, or at least strategic 
alliances take place. Yet, Italy’s big family businesses have traditionally 
been unable to organise such deals.82 83Judging from the underlying 
logic of the network, two hypotheses can be advanced for this peculiar 
inability. The first is that Italian business is still led by the condottieri 
(the Italian “captains of industry”): in this, the notion of absolute 
control is very important, and the idea of power-sharing difficult even 
to conceive. If the first reason is therefore linked to the particular mana­
gerial culture widely shared in big and small enterprises,8’ the second 
is due to the logic of the closed club: it would upset the entire system 
were joint ventures or share exchanges to allow outsiders to enter.
The protection of the club in an internationalised context has become 
a permanent headache for the Old Guard. When Ford was ready to buy 
Alfa Romeo in the 1980s, FIAT duly financed by Mediobanca, stepped 
in to keep it out. Yet, by the end of the 1980s, some members of the 
club showed signs of strain: Olivetti is heavily in debt, Ferruzzi is 
bankrupt. In December 1991, Pirelli shares collapsed after the unsuc­
cessful merger with Continental (the firm has since consolidated). 
Agnelli, for his part, is still growing: adding further acquisitions by 
diversifying into the food industry (Galbani in July 1989); an agreement 
between FIAT and Ford in August 1990, with which FIAT becomes the 
world’s second largest producer of tractors and earth-moving equip­
ment; on 28 September 1993, Fiat announced the biggest recapital­
isation in Italian history of £4250 billion ($US 2.6 bn) with a rearrange-
82 Giandomenico Majone has drawn my attention to this subject.
83 This managerial culture is inscribed in the specific Italian form of capitalism, 
characterised by “industrial growth without the development of an industrial society.” 
See Giulio Sapelli, Sul capitalismo italiano. Trasformazione o declino (Milano: 



























































































40 S t e f a n o  G u z z i n i
ment of the board, still controlled by an enlarged Mediobanca-Agnelli 
syndicate. The strategy is to avoid international mergers, and to imitate 
the German system where big industry relies on banks and insurance 
firms - thus buttressing the traditional Italian system of family control: 
on 11 November 1993, the fourth generation of Agnellis in the person 
of Gianni Agnelli jr. joined the board of FIAT.
Today’s privatisation, together with the liberalisation of financial and 
insurance markets, will decide whether the future form of Italy’s organ­
ised capitalism will be just another form of the club or not. The 
privatisation of Mediobanca between 1985 and 1987 was an attempt by 
the government to curb the club’s tight control. “Privatisation” becomes 
a game between the government and the club where “Mediobanca plays 
its last cards to keep its central financial position in the national system 
of big capitalism”.84 Since the package of privatisations will require 
around £6000 billion ($US 3.8 bn),85 Cuccia’s has been draining the 
liquidity of the stock market toward Mediobanca which can be used by 
the bank itself or channelled to the club. In September 1993, he raised 
Mediobanca's capital by £1000 billion ($US 0.65 bn.), which raised his 
liquid disposition to £6011 billion. At the same time, despite the 
government’s decision to install a more decentralised control of Italian 
big industry and finance by a form of diffused shareownership (“public 
company”) with a maximum of 3% shares per holder, the club’s 
member have been able to gain control of the managing board, for the 
Banca Commerciale Italiana with just 29% of the shares. Of course, the 
capital of these banks can now been used to support the club’s interests 
in the coming privatisation of other industries.
These tactics of draining and controlling Italian liquidities would of 
course be insufficient were the Italian corporate system not to also deter 
major foreign investors.86 These investors would like to come if the 
Italian system changed in three respects: it must respect the minority
84 Marcello Zacché, “Cuccia spara sulla Borsa una raffica da mille milliardi,” 
Mondo Economico, voi. XLVIII, no. 38 (18-24 September), pp. 56-57 (my 
translation).
85 Guido Plutino, “E il rischio indigestione spaventa Piazza Affari,” Mondo 
Economico, voi. XLVIII, no. 38 (18-24 September 1993), pp. 57-58.
86 The Italian share in the foreign portfolio of international pension funds is very 
low at around 1.6%. See Marcello Zacché, “Scomessa da un milliardo di dollari,” 



























































































The implosion of clientelistic Italy in the 1990s 41
right of shareholders; it must be transparent in its information about the 
companies; it must give foreign investors the right to become board- 
members.87 In short, the club should drastically change its rules. As 
long as the club can delay this reform, drain private liquidities, and use 
privatised bank money to buy up industries, it has a chance of 
“winning” the privatisation dispute for sheer lack of competitors.
To summarise the trigger of the big business indifference or anta­
gonism to the central government, one can say that the club reacted to 
both the state’s (parties’) and international actors’ attempt to break into 
the club. The family business is pushed into a finance-intensive protect­
ion of its rules, and has seen a further concentration around Agnelli and 
Mediobanca. In this context of increased financial needs, two further 
hypothesis should be examined. First, the decline of national power 
made the political class less interesting as a bribing target, and it seems 
indeed that at least FIAT is now lobbying directly in Brussels. Second, 
domestic privatisations reduce the need to collaborate with the state and 
pose as a problem the diffusion of control to other private domestic and 
international actors. Here, a weaker state gives the club greater scope 
to preserve its integrity.88
The story is very different for small business. Whereas the club 
organises nationally, the most successful part of small business in the 
“Third Italy” (not the traditionally rich North-West and poor South, but 
newly rich Center-North-East) is based on the smooth functioning of a 
form of “localistic” rule. It is the reproduction crisis of these local 
subsystems that lie at the bottom of the Leagues’ electoral uprooting of 
traditional DC regions.89
87 Marco Niada, “La City ci dà fiducia ma prende ancora tempo.” Mondo 
Economico, voi. XLVIII, no. 28 (10-16 July 1993), pp. 61-62.
88 Normally the fear of being excluded from the Europe of Maastricht is mention­
ed as a reason. Although (at least initially) the foreign pressure on the Italian govern­
ment to drastically reduce its deficit had an impact on Italian politics, it was not 
pushing industrialists to de-solidarize (Giuliano Amato calls it an “over-rationaliza­
tion”). Industrialists were relatively happy when they saw the chance of returning to 
the old system: competitive devaluation and nationally protected markets that give 
them time to adapt and to control the reorganisation of Italian production and finance.
89 For the following, see the remarkable study by Carlo Trigilia, Grandi partili e 
piccole imprese. Comunisti e democristiani nelle regioni di economia diffusa 



























































































42 S t e f a n o  G u z z i n i
The Third Italy is characterised by the rule of political subcultures, 
understood as a particular localistic political system based on a high 
social consensus and capacity to mediate between particularistic inte­
rests. They are the result of the institutionalisation of social movements 
whose access to central government has been blocked, namely political 
Catholicism in the Nort-East and socialism/communism in the Centre- 
North. These “localistic” systems developed to a defensive response of 
local traditional social relations to economic and central state pene­
tration since the beginning of this century and have been reinforced in 
the post-1945 period. Their capacity of aggregation and interest media­
tion is shown by the fact that their very flexible industrial organisation 
grew concomitantly with the highest rates of trade-unionisation and 
associationism in general.
The working of these subsystems has become more complicated. On 
the one hand, social mobility, urbanisation, and more generally the de­
creasing hold of the catholic and socialist value-systems tied the fate of 
the subcultures and small enterprises even closer together. The legitima- 
tory consensus became more dependent on direct benefits that the poli­
tical system can provide for the increasingly differentiated social inter­
ests. These local interests, in turn, must rely increasingly on political 
resources rather than traditional or cultural ones. On the other hand, the 
localistic rule shows difficulties of scale in the recent context of more 
global competition. On the business side, the expansion of the particular 
small family structure often seem to have reached their financial and 
managerial limits. On the level of territorial subcultures, by the mid- 
1980s, Trigilia pointed out that the diffused economy in the Third Italy 
would logically need a regional level on which to rebuild the same 
localistic political organisation of small and medium-sized enterprises. 
On this regional level, however, the political class is less bound by 
cultural loyalties and neither strong nor competent enough to substitute 
itslef on a greater scale to the intial localistic rule.
In this context, with the rising neo-liberal ideologies and the 
economic crisis of the second half of the 1980s the Leagues made their 
electoral fortune whereas the “red belt” resisted much better (able to 
play on its oppositional nature to the central government). 
Régionalisation, fédéralisation, and so on can therefore be seen also as 
indicators of an adaptation crisis of a particular economic-political 



























































































The implosion o f clientelistic Italy in the 1990s 43
traditional political interlocutor, the DC.
Besides electoral opposition, the business class also desolidarised 
from the political class, as expressed by the sudden and extensive colla­
boration with the judiciary to unmask the underground financing of 
“bribesville.” For smaller industrialists, who had to “contribute” if they 
were not to be excluded from public contracts, the mere financial 
burden of the corruption became unbearbale. The traditionally largely 
self-financed family business, which preferred bank credits to stock 
market financing, has become overexposed to short-term credits. 
Whereas German business credits are 70% long-term and 30% short­
term, in Italy it is the opposite. The small family structure and 
managerial culture have been very successful in flexible production, but 
not always in financial mangement. Ever higher requests by the 
business politicians, and the exclusion from contracts despite paying 
have thus pushed businessmen to start collaboration in the legal 
enquiries. Once the judges knew some links of the chain, they could 
retrace more and more corruption. Since it became clear that business­
men could limit the disaster of corruption by collaborating, and since 
the political class were really hurt, the businessmen left the business 
politicians with whom they had worked before to swing in the wind.
Conclusion
This chapter has served three purposes. First, it has contributed to the 
research programmme of more society-based theories in IPE. Second, 
it has offered an explanation of the recent changes in Italy that would 
counter the usual post Cold-War account. Third, it wanted to add some 
items to the agenda of peaceful change in Europe. This conclusion will 
summarise the argument concerning Italy before putting it back into the 
context of peaceful change.
Provoked by this assumed importance of international events, the 
present chapter tried to see how the triggers of the recent outbreak of 
the crisis can be understood. The most important triggers are commonly 
seen in the electoral decline of the major parties, the appearance of new 
(anti-system) parties, the sudden explosion of corruption and illegal 
financing that became known and persecuted, the rash de-solidarisation 
of business from the political class (pentitismo imprenditoriale), the 
cracking of the codes of honour within the mafia {pentitismo mafioso), 
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The end of the the Cold War-account emphasises the variable of 
ideological legitimacy and concentrates therefore on the electoral de­
cline of the old parties and the institutional reforms. Yet, it is peculiar 
that all commentators agree that the legitimacy of the system was large­
ly clientelistic, but that for those close to the overlay-thesis, this 
clientelism is always seen in strictly party-political terms. Yet, 
delegitimation occurred long before in the system whose stabilising 
contract was based on a financial distribution throughout the clientelistic 
nets not only of the party-system, but also in business and organised 
crime. Rule was more often vertical than horizontal. Indeed, its 
strengths derived from a large cooption of very different social groups 
into the “contract”—and still does. (See Figure 1 for a simplified 
synthesis of the exchanges90).
The exacerbation and diffusion of the system was increasingly 
difficult to contain. The trials for corruption have shown a significant 
increase since the beginning of the 1980s. Only now, when the fiscal 
and financial crisis has profoundly shattered the system, has the crisis 
broken out. It remains to be seen, whether this will only keep some of 
the clientelistic nets and privileges at the expense of weaker clienteles, 
The newly elected government has proposed tax-cuts in a country where 
60% of the firms do not pay tax at all. The fiscal evasion is calculated 
between £ 150-200 billion, enough to make a budget surplus every year. 
The IMF and the OECD have never made any secret of their belief, that 
a reasonable structural adjustment in Italy would inevitably envisage the 
closure of this evasion as an obvious way of easing the budget (not 
through higher taxes, but through their enforcement).91
Thus, the thesis of the end of the Cold War as a condition for the 
outbreak of the Italian crisis must be revised. International events play­
ed a role in recent changes in Italy. But instead of emphasising the 
power-and ideology-impact of the bipolar superpower overlay and its 
translation into bipolar party-politics, the present account stressed those 
factors that had an effect on the necessary financial means for the re­
production of the consociational-clientelistic system. The international
90 They do, of course, capture only the covert part of Italian politics. The central 
mediators, the business politicians, can be simultaneously also mafiosi or businessmen.
91 There is no doubt, however, that the byzantine tax system, filled with leggine, 



























































































The implosion o f clientelistic Italy in the 1990s 45
Figure 1. Covert politics in Italy (The ellipse corresponds to the party- 




























































































46 S t e f a n o  G u z z i n i
system exacerbated the scissor movement of the network’s increasing 
financial demand and state’s budget constraints. Financial markets made 
future debts more costly. The EC, by imposing an opening of state con­
tracts to non-Italian firms and by prohibiting the state funding of public 
company debt as a violation of the EC competition law, severely cur­
tailed the distribution capacity of the regime - and undermined financial 
loyalty.92
Whereas the state-society nexus of the ouside-in approach stops at 
the political system, this account concentrated on the articulation of 
covert and overt politics in major institutionalised networks. Therefore, 
this chapter hopes to have shown the usefulness of a more societal IPE 
approach and prepares the ground for some concluding remarks on the 
“Italian front” of domestic European politics.
As mentioned above, this chapter works on the assumption that a 
successful attempt to come to grips with the structural problems of 
modern democracies is a condition for a more peaceful Europe, both 
for its stabilising domestic effects as well as its attraction to other 
countries. The encouraging novelty of the present Italian “crisis” is the 
attempt, at least initially, to overcome these structural problems.
The major issue both in the Italian crisis and in present liberal 
democracies, is “legitimacy”. The starting point of the crisis is the 
dismantling of a vast part of covert rule in Italy. In many respects, the 
underlying topic is the relation between white-collar and organised 
crime on the one hand,93 and the legitimacy crisis and the possibilities 
for democratic reform, on the other hand.
First, let us start with organised crime which is a totalitarian attack 
on democracy. It is characterised by an incessant attempt to expand its
92 Giandomenico Majone has drawn my attention to the indirect impact of the
EC/EU.
93 The relations of white-collar crime and organised crime have become in­
creasingly enmeshed. The famous Italian example is Roberto Calvi whose Banco 
Ambrosiano was laundering money for the secret masonic lodge P2 and the cosca of 
the Corleonesi. Getting into speculative problems, he might not have honoured mafia 
money. Whereas “normal” evaders usually do not show up to reclaim it, the mafia 
does. In June 1982, Calvi was found hanging under a London bridge. See Letizia 
Paoli, “Criminalità organizzata e finanza d’avventura” and R.T. Naylor, Hot Money 



























































































The implosion o f clientelistic Italy in the 1990s 47
rule.94 It literally kills pluralist associational life, “legal” private enter­
prise and competitive markets, or more generally, public space. It repro­
duces poverty and fear in order to reproduce a need for protection: thus, 
a whole people is effectively racketeered.95
To combat the Italian mafia, Minister of Interior Mancino went to 
Moscow on 11 September 1993.96 Secret services had reported two 
meetings (Zürich, Prague) of representatives of the major US, Italian, 
Ukrainian and Russian mafia organisations presumably to form a cartel 
and to collaborate on money laundering and drug/arms deals. The ob­
vious risk is double: emerging democracies are suffocated and even the 
most efficient struggle against organised crime in one country is useless, 
when the markets are flooded from “abroad”. Therefore, Eastern and 
Central European authorities are collaborating in a database on organ­
ised crime (“data-drag”), and the Italian authorities are allowed to 
pursue Italians in Russia.
One of the first results is the successful tumbling of a mafia £2000 
billion ($US 1.25 billion) deal to buy up one of the formerly state- 
owned major banks in St. Petersburg. The mafia(s) wanted to launder 
money through this bank (which was also to be used for buying up 
private property that the Russian government is expected to sell).97 In 
order to stop the mafia’s totalitarian grip on established and emerging 
democratic societies, a much better system of bank control is needed. 
As long as organised crime does not print a convertible currency, it 
depends on banks for a “cash connection” (cfr. the 1984 interim report 
of the US presidential commission on organised crime).
Otherwise, once the mafias are in, good luck to démocratisation! The 
Marshall Plans for the East can have only ameliorate the situation part­
ially, as in the Mezzogiorno. Yet, European politics should not indulge 
in another double standard. EEC structural funds or Marshall Plans to 
the East can be rightly criticised for being milked by the covert system.
94 Luciano Violante, /  corleonesi. Mafia e sistema eversivo, p. 23.
95 The mafia fits perfectly into the reproduction of the vicious circle of distrust 
that charaterizes particularly Southern Italy and which stops “democracy working”. 
For this argument, see Robert D. Putnam (with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. 
Nanetti) Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993).
96 Television news report on TG2 (19.45 pm) on 11 September 1993.



























































































48 S t e f a n o  G u z z i n i
But if the aim is to attack one major cause, namely organised crime, 
OECD governments have a long tradition of never controlling the 
banks98 through which organised crime has built its financial power. 
Italians know that it is bad politics, but good publicity to appear 
(relatively) generous with money and to blame entrepreneurial 
incapacity or cultural backwardness for the lacking results.
Secondly, there is the tricky question of white-collar crime. The 
literature generally distinguishes two types, “occupational” and 
“organisational”. The first capitalises on a specific position and is about 
personal gains, the second type is “supported, encouraged, and 
oftentimes even required by the operational norms of the organisation 
in which it occurs.”99 This is not restricted, as we have seen in the 
above analyzed networks, to party financing. The Italian crisis can 
hence be described as a reaction against a system of organisational 
white-collar crime.
The micro-dynamic of white-collar crime is to crowd out “legal” 
competitors (see above), and this “stabilised” the Italian system, but has 
become a factor of delegitimation. Delegitimation has occurred because 
this covert system is based on the breaking or non-enforcement of law: 
it creates a systematic double standard between those who can enter the 
networks of covert exchanges and those who cannot. Yet, legality in the 
modern democratic state must be rational and impersonal (at least in the 
Weberian sense). These formal conditions of justification replace the 
impossible metaphysical foundations for legitimacy. When the client- 
elistic systematic double standard makes legality the exception and not 
the rule, the system enters into
the vicious circle of reciprocal disaffection or mutual complicity: power 
today is ignored or immediately instrumentalised, from the top and from 
the bottom, as sources of privileges (and this complicity breaks down 
today with the limitation of resources to be distributed).100
98 Marcello de Cecco, “Financial Relations: Between Internationalism and Trans­
nationalism,” in Roger Morgan, Jochen Lorentzen, Anna Leander, Stefano Guzzini 
(eds), New Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World. Essays for Susan Strange 
(London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 102-10.
99 James W. Coleman, The Criminal Elite. The Sociology of While Collar Crime 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), p. 8.
100 Carlo Galli, “Crisi di legalità, crisi di legittimità,” Il Mulino, vol. XL, no. 338 
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The more the post-1945 societal project of moral, economic and institu­
tional reconstruction receded, the more the system relied upon a 
consociational-clientelistic logic to produce consent, the more it lost 
legitimacy, the more it needed to resort to covert exchanges, which in 
turn undermined legitimacy, and so on.101 A de facto double standard 
system has a structural legitimacy problem.
Gianfranco Pasquino envisaged a possible implosion of the system 
as far back as the early 1980s. He saw three possible triggers: fractions 
of civil society pushing for change; that political sectors would become 
more responsive to public ethics; and that entrepreneurs become aware 
of European constraints. As already mentioned, the latter has proved to 
be a relatively weak trigger.102 The strongest opposition came from 
where one should have logically, but not actually, expected it, from the 
police and judiciary. Not market constraints, or civil society at large, but 
a state agency has been the major antagonist of white-collar (political 
and economic) crime in the party-state.
Why has the judiciary campaign been effective,, when for decades 
it never succeeded? Besides the inherent illegitimacy and thus potential 
weakness of a system of double standards, there is also an institutional 
reason for why an explosion took place in the 1990s and not before. 
The hidden financing was traditionally handled by very few mediators 
in the party headquarters. The laws for régionalisation decentralised and 
boosted the numbers of potential mediators. Secrecy is much more 
difficult to maintain in such a system.103
Yet, the judiciary’s answers are insufficient. The individualist law 
system has no problems in pursuing “occupational” crime. Confronted 
with systematic “organisational” crime, however, the pools of magis­
trates have been asking for a “political” solution, first misunderstood as 
an appeal for a general amnesty. The real question is that of how to
Û■*< ' ,




101 For a similar version of this vicious circle, see Jurgen Habermas, Rekonstruk- 
tion des Historischen Materialismus (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1976), p. 320. Here, 
the state’s increasing incapacity to produce the resource Sinn is met with increasing 
material compensations. A legitimacy crisis occurs, when the system cannot find any 
satisfactory Smn-substitutions or when the expected material gains outweigh the 
available resources.
102 See also Donatella della Porta, “La logica della corruzione in Italia,” // Mulino, 
vol. XL, no. 337 (September-October 1991), p. 914.



























































































50 S t e f a n o  G u z z i n i
create a legitimate social contract based on a new relationship between 
open and covert politics. This is more than a judiciary can do. The 
widely cherished debate about institutional reforms (electoral law, 
presidentialism, federalism, and so on) is important, but it is no 
substitute for structural reform. The crisis of the Italian system 
emphasizes the need for more transparency and responsiveness in 
domestic and transnational politics. Domestically, this implies the clear 
separation of the spheres of politics, economy, the law and the mass- 
media.104 Transnationally, one of the biggest problems consists in the 
control of illegal markets and their mediators.105
On both “fronts”, recent developments are not necessarily inducing 
optimism. Instead of joining in a common attempt to attack illegal 
markets, governments are playing a game of “competitive off-shor- 
isation”.106 Domestically, with the crisis of the old system, a really 
pluralist associational life, outside the parties, has yet to emerge. It is 
not at all clear, which social force on the base of which leading utopia 
will help to bring the new social contract about, when in other 
European countries both the welfarist and neo-liberal contracts that have 
been attempted, have increased electoral disaffection or anti-system 
votes.107 There is an increasing impression that the initial shame and 
mobilisation over the extent of the covert system has given way to 
sentiments of exteriorised revenge and a will to forget. The signs of the 
recent electoral campaign do not presage optimism, either: public de­
bates were reduced to pre-established or re-cycled dichotomous schemes 
and politicians were increasingly seen as corrupters with no real link 
(and thus responsibility attached) to the wider population.
104 It is therefore not fortuitous that Michael Walzer’s Spheres o f Justice (New 
York: Basic Books, 1983) is particularly well received among Italian liberals.
105 This adds the (covert) Italian personnel to the emerging transnational class. See 
in particular Susan Strange, “The Name of the Game,” in N. Rizopoulos (ed.), Sea- 
Changes. American Foreign Policy in a World Transformed (New York and London: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1990), pp. 262-65.
106 On the increased importance of off-shores, see also Ronen Palan, 
“Globalization and the World Economy” (Paper prepared for the International 
Organization Development Association 7th Annual World Conference, 29 November-3 
December 1992, Coventry).
,07 We seem not much further than in Jurgen Habermas’ succinct statement from 
the 1980s, “Die Krise des Wohlfahrtsstaates und die Erschopfung utopischer Ener­



























































































The implosion o f clientelistic Italy in the 1990s 51
The elections might even have exacerbated the problems. If one of 
the problems of the italian democracy is the lacking independence of 
the political and economic system in both directions, the vote for a 
media tycoon who was still managing his TV channels when he was 
launching himself, and still owns them, has not resolved the problem — 
it has, at best, only made it more visible.108 But more importantly per­
haps, the electorate seems to be tired of change. Mario Segni, the 
initiator of the referenda that helped to undermine the system was 
defeated in his constituency. Antonio Caponetto, a magistrate who was 
the founder of the pool system within which Falcone and Borsellino 
could organise their successes against the mafia, was defeated in 
Palermo. After the election, there were mafia-campaigns of intimidation 
against local left-wing administrators (houses burned, etc). Finally, there 
were (small) demonstrations in favour of supposed mafia-bosses in 
Messina (Sicily).
Indeed, maybe the nearly three years from the referendum in 1991 
that abolished the multiple preferential vote. against the explicit wishes j 
of major parts of the ruling parties, until the recent elections will not be 
seen as a new start, but just an intermezzo during which observers 
caught a short and unprecedented sight on the Italian covert/overt 
system. It still seems premature to talk about an Italian “Second 
Republic”.
Despite due caution about its outcome, the recent crisis has made 
Italy a laboratory for experiments which aim, or aimed, at finding a 
viable new social contract in a changed global political economy. This 
social contract can only come about plurinationally, i.e. though common 
efforts across societies. Indeed, it has become difficult to separate 
“national” social contracts. Thus, sustained efforts in Italy and abroad
108 This does not mean that Berlusconi won because of his television channels. On 
the “electoral market” in Italy, the left never won more than 35-40%. When the DC 
was in crisis, a large share of the electorate was unsure about whom to vote, especial­
ly in the South where the Lega Nord was not such an appealing candidate. Forza 
Italia targetted precisely on this part of the elctoral market and got more than 30% in 
Sicily. It is, however, impressive to see continuity of the Italian vote in the 20th 
century, including the repeated preference of the centre-right to ally rather with the 
extreme-right than with the left (with the exception of the “historical compromise”). 
For this argument, see also Norberto Bobbio, “La sinistra fa paura allTtalia”, La 



























































































52 S t e f a n o  G u z z i n i
are needed to oppose the emerging tendency to create systematic double 
standards, to restore legitimacy and to provide a pole for democratic 
attraction. The successful management of this change would be a crucial 
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